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We explore the dynamics of the Scottish National Party (SNP) support using the
British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) during 1999-06. We study the relative impor-
tance of political sentiments and egocentric economic evaluations by disentangling the
effects of state dependence and unobserved heterogeneity by gender. Egocentric economic
evaluations constitute an important determinant of SNP support over the entire period,
being this effect stronger among the male electorate. The results are consistent with
the electors holding the incumbent Labour Party accountable for their personal financial
situation, though financial security augments the nationalist propensity among partisan
voters. Furthermore, retrospective economic evaluations form a significant determinant of
incumbent Labour Party support in both the 1999-02 and 2003-06 intervening electoral
cycles.
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1. INTRODUCTION
How important are economic evaluations in political party support? Do ego-
centric economic perceptions indicate distinct political behaviour by gender or par-
tisanship? We analyse these questions by exploring the dynamics of political party
support and egocentric economic evaluations in Scotland during 1999-2006. Our
investigation has a double aim: on one hand, to analyse the relative importance of
political sentiments in the evolution of SNP support and, on the other, to test the
egocentric (“pocketbook”) economic voting hypothesis.
Utilising the Scottish extension sample from the BHPS, we find that the impact
of egocentric economic evaluations varies by partisan attachment and gender, and
that failure to study separately the partisan electorate can lead to erroneous con-
clusions about the role of economic evaluations. In particular, regarding the whole
electorate, egocentric economic evaluations exert a stronger influence on male SNP
support, while initial party affiliation constitutes the most important party sup-
port determinant among the partisan subsamples (regardless of gender). Moreover,
financial stability and optimism augment partisan voters’ support for the (opposi-
tion) SNP instead of the (incumbent) Labour Party thus, reversing the prediction
of economic voting theories among the partisan electorates. Finally, concerning
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the entire electorate, the electors hold the incumbent government (Labour) party
accountable for their personal financial situation.
To ensure that our analysis is not merely capturing determinants of national-
ist propensity and to account for outflows from the Labour party to parties other
than the SNP, we additionally estimate models of incumbent Labour Party sup-
port. Employing the Labour support indicator produces the mirror image of the
initial estimates for SNP support: the economic evaluations increasing SNP support
reduce the incumbent Labour party support and vice-versa.
As an additional validation test of the economic voting hypothesis, accounting
for the dynamics triggered in different phases of the intervening electoral cycles,
we estimate (incumbent) Labour support models for the 1999-2002 and 2003-2006
electoral cycles. The estimates clearly indicate that retrospective economic evalua-
tions constitute an important determinant of the incumbent party support during
both electoral cycles.
Studies such as Evans and Pickup (2010) and Johnston et al. (2005) provide ev-
idence against economic voting theories and in favour of the endogeneity argument,
i.e., that individual economic evaluations are conditioned by political preferences
rather than vice-versa. Evans and Pickup (2010) conclude that the incumbent
presidential approval and party identification affect egocentric evaluations while
the reverse does not hold. Johnston et al. (2005) find that upon controlling for
prior elections’ vote, egocentric evaluations have no effect. None of these studies
disaggregates by either gender or party proximity.
Our results extend the findings and conclusions of Sanders and Brynin (1999),
Evans and Andersen (2006), Nadeau et al. (2012) and Pickup and Evans (2013)
in two important respects. On one side, Sanders and Brynin (1999) find that eco-
nomic perceptions exert important indirect effects on voters’ preferences although
ideological change variables, when included in the same model, outperform changes
in economic evaluations. Similarly, Evans and Andersen (2006) conclude that the
impact of lagged party support on (sociotropic) economic evaluations is consis-
tently stronger than the effects of concurrent and retrospective economic evalua-
tions on party support. In an international comparative study, using instrumen-
tation Nadeau et al. (2012) conclude that (sociotropic) economic evaluations are
significant, although ideology, past vote recall and partisanship exert more powerful
influences.1 These findings are in agreement with our result that for the partisan
fraction of the electorate the impact of egocentric evaluations is reduced and, there-
fore, that failure to study separately the partisan electorate can lead to erroneous
conclusions about the impact of egocentric economic evaluations.
On the other side, Pickup and Evans (2013) conclude that long-term differ-
ences in economic evaluations across individuals do influence party support, while
short-term economic evaluations do not, underlining the need to employ panel data
for a longer time period. Indeed, we find that the most important party support
determinant for the male electorate, other than initial support, is consistently ex-
pecting uncertain/worse finances. Further, among the partisan electorate consistent
positive financial expectations and satisfactory current finances are the principal
egocentric determinants of SNP support for males and females, respectively.
Our estimates account for initial political preferences, gender, and partisanship
strength heterogeneity. Moreover, we incorporate dynamics, employ compact un-
balanced and balanced panel sample selection mechanisms and account for unequal
sample selection probabilities. To the best of our knowledge, the present study is
unique in investigating the egocentric economic voting hypothesis and analysing
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longitudinal party support by both partisan proximity and gender.2
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents and discusses data issues.
Section 3 outlines the estimation method, discusses sample selection and attrition
issues, and the treatment of initial conditions. Section 4 is devoted to the analysis of
the estimation results, first discussing the key determinants of SNP support and the
importance of egocentric economic evaluations. Second, it analyses the incumbent
Labour Party support and the validity of the economic voting hypothesis over the
two intervening electoral cycles in the period under study. Section 5 concludes.
2. THE DATA
We use waves 9 to 16 of the BHPS, including the Scotland extension sample,
spanning the period 1999-2006. This dataset contains information from a very rich
questionnaire addressed to about 1,500 Scottish households on a yearly basis. In
addition, we have access to local authority district codes at the household level via
the special conditional access, medium-level geographical identifiers, component
of the BHPS, which allows us to control for intra-Scottish regional variation in
political party preferences.3,4 Since our main interest is the longitudinal evolution
of political party preferences and voting intentions, accounting for initial conditions,
we consider respondents that are aged 16 or more and that participate in the survey
over at least 3 consecutive periods (permitting inclusion of both dynamics and
initial period political affiliation). The choice of age is motivated by the Age of
Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991 and by the fact that voting age was reduced to
16 for the 2014 Scottish independence referendum (yet the number of individuals
aged below 18 is very small). In addition, the main samples analysed consider only
respondents present in 1999 (to facilitate initial conditions estimation) that have no
missing values (to allow for lagged party support) in any of the covariates used in
the estimations. These compact unbalanced panels consist of 5,059 male and 5,580
female observations, respectively. A discussion of alternative estimation samples
and attrition issues is relegated to Section 3.
2.1. Measuring Political Party Preferences
The ‘political party supported’ is a derived variable from a sequence of follow-
up questions asked in all waves of the BHPS. These questions are: (1) Generally
speaking do you think of yourself as a supporter of any one political party? (2) Do
you think of yourself as a little closer to one political party than to the others? (3)
If there were to be a general election tomorrow, which political party do you think
you would be most likely to support? Respondents are asked question (2) only if
they answered ‘No’ to question (1) and are asked question (3) only if they answered
‘No’ to question (2). Finally, if the answer to any of the first two questions is ‘Yes’,
respondents are also asked question (4) Which party do you regard yourself as being
closer to than the others?
From the above set of BHPS questions we define the dependent variable as a
binary indicator of party support taking the value of one if the individual’s stated
party in either question (3) or (4) is the SNP, and zero otherwise. The corresponding
answers to questions (3) and (4) are given in Tables 1 and 2.
We distinguish between two types of respondents or voters, henceforth referred
to as partisans and non-partisans. We define as partisans those respondents that
consistently (i.e. in every year of individual sample membership) answered ‘Yes’
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to either question (1) or question (2), and non-partisans (ideologically neutral) as
those that were repeatedly asked question (3). Initially we consider joint estimation
including both subsamples by summing the responses of questions (3) and (4). In
a second stage we consider the two subsamples separately to test whether partisan-
ship produces differential political party preference underlying determinants, but
disregard non-partisan estimates due to an insufficient number of observations.
Defining the dependent variable as an indicator of SNP support is corroborated
by the transition probability matrices reported in Tables 3 and 4, where the majority
of outflows/inflows of SNP supporters correspond to gains/losses of the governing
Labour Party over the period analysed. To account for outflows from the Labour
party to parties other than the SNP, an event not captured by our specification
of the dependent variable, we will construct an alternative Labour Party support
indicator. Our findings indicate that the estimates conduce to the same conclusions
independently of the dependent variable specification.
TABLE 1.—MALE RESPONDENTS: POLITICAL PARTY SUPPORTED
Political Party 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total
Labour 56 56 67 41 19 25 297
SNP 36 44 31 32 21 24 234
Conservative 13 7 9 11 6 5 65
Lib Dem, SDP 15 20 23 25 31 19 163
Green Party 1 0 1 3 3 1 11
other party 4 1 3 3 6 2 23
other answer 3 9 4 0 3 0 19
none 46 48 55 42 46 36 336
inapplicable 628 617 609 528 444 396 3,911
Total 802 802 802 685 579 508 5,059
Political Party 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total
Labour 271 295 300 257 207 177 1,815
SNP 198 168 156 134 110 89 1,016
Conservative 101 99 87 76 68 65 606
Lib Dem /Lib/SDP 46 41 51 48 46 46 362
Green party 3 4 5 4 3 5 28
Plaid Cymru 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
other party 6 9 7 8 10 12 72
other answer 1 0 1 0 0 1 3
none 2 1 2 0 0 1 8
inapplicable 174 185 193 157 135 112 1,148
Total 802 802 802 685 579 508 5,059
1. Source: University of Essex, ISER, BHPS, Waves 9-16.
2. Sample includes individuals with Ti>2 and no missing values in any of the covariates in 
the (full sample compact unbalanced) estimations of Table 5.
Party which would vote for tomorrow
Asked if: No political party supported/Not closer to one particular political party 
Year
Political party closest to
Asked if: Supporting a particular political party/Closer to one political party than to the others 
Year
The BHPS also includes a question about actual party voted for in the 1999
and 2003 Scottish elections. However, actual vote choice is likely to be a proxy
for partisanship affiliation and political beliefs, which in turn can predetermine
egocentric and sociotropic evaluations in actual elections. Hence, the association
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between prior political affiliation and individual economic evaluations is more likely
to be disentangled by using an indicator of political party support, particularly
outside electoral periods (Evans and Andersen, 2006, p.197).
TABLE 2.—FEMALE RESPONDENTS: POLITICAL PARTY SUPPORTED
Asked if: No political party supported/Not closer to one particular political party 
Political Party 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total
Labour 72 58 72 51 28 23 25 19 348
SNP 47 55 43 26 23 29 17 22 262
Conservative 18 11 9 10 6 3 7 7 71
Lib Dem, SDP 14 30 32 17 21 19 13 7 153
Green Party 2 4 3 1 2 3 2 2 19
other party 2 0 0 0 1 3 1 0 7
other answer 6 3 4 0 1 1 0 0 15
none 51 59 57 43 50 42 24 29 355
inapplicable 703 695 695 605 499 426 390 337 4,350
Total 915 915 915 753 631 549 479 423 5,580
Asked if: Supporting a particular political party/Closer to one political party than to the others 
Political Party 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total
Labour 326 340 355 284 233 194 180 153 2,065
SNP 151 139 121 125 88 73 73 61 831
Conservative 143 139 127 111 96 82 71 65 834
Lib Dem /Lib/SDP 70 66 77 71 69 62 58 52 525
Green Party 6 5 7 6 6 9 4 4 47
other party 5 5 6 6 6 6 4 1 39
none 2 1 2 2 1 0 0 1 9
inapplicable 212 220 220 148 132 123 89 86 1,230
Total 915 915 915 753 631 549 479 423 5,580
1. Source: University of Essex, ISER, BHPS, Waves 9-16.
2. Sample includes individuals with Ti>2 and no missing values in any of the covariates in the
 (full sample compact unbalanced) estimations of Table 6.
Party which would vote for tomorrow
Year
Political party closest to
Year
The determinants of individual political adherence/affiliation are typically un-
observed and fairly hard to quantify, one can feel loyal to certain political principles
and at the same time feel closer to more than one political party, changing actual po-
litical party support over time. To measure the degree of political party attachment
over time we use an additional question asked to those respondents that consider
themselves as supporters of or feel closer to one particular party (i.e., respondents
that gave an affirmative answer to either question (1) or question (2) above). They
are asked whether they consider themselves a very strong, fairly strong or not very
strong party supporter. The corresponding variable, termed ‘strong party support’,
will refer to individuals having indicated either very or fairly strong party support.
Nationalist sentiments determining party affiliation could be captured by the
perceived nationality variable in the BHPS, but this question is only available for
the years 1999, 2002, 2003 and 2006. As a robustness test, we estimate all models
including a variable indicating whether an individual feels Scottish/more Scottish
in 1999 (treating perceived nationality as time-invariant). Although this variable
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generally enters all models with statistically significant positive coefficients, our
results and conclusions remain unaltered.
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Compact Unbalanced Panels
Figure 1. Evolution of Political Party Support by Gender
Labour SNP
Conservative Lib Dem/Lib/SDP
other party/none
FIG. 1 Evolution of Political Party Support by Gender.
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Figure 2. Evolution of Party Support by Gender (Partisans)
Labour SNP
Conservative Lib Dem/Lib/SDP
other party/none/do not know
FIG. 2 Evolution of Party Support by Gender (Partisans).
Figures 1 and 2 display the longitudinal evolution of aggregate political party
support from the entire sample (non-partisan and partisan) and from the partisan
subsample, respectively. Figure 1 reveals that the incumbent Labour party is the
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majority party, while the SNP is the second most popular party regarding both
genders throughout the period, being Labour support generally higher among fe-
male respondents and SNP support higher among male respondents. Considering
only partisan respondents, Figure 2 reveals that the SNP remains the second most
supported party only among male partisans and falls to the third place (behind the
Conservative party) among female partisans. That men are markedly more likely
than women to support the SNP is a well known feature of the Scottish electorate,
but empirical works trying to explain it are scarce. Using the 2007 Scottish Elec-
tion Study and the SNP membership survey, Johns et al. (2011) find that the main
factor explaining the gender gap in SNP support is that women are less supportive
of independence.
2.2. Egocentric Economic Evaluations
Economic voting models establish that changes in the relative popularity of the
incumbent government/opposition party are influenced by voters’ perceptions of
economic conditions. Depending on the model specification, these perceptions can
be about current, past or future economic conditions. There are two dimensions
of economic evaluations: egocentric/egotropic (about the personal economic situ-
ation) and sociotropic (about national economic conditions). The BHPS includes
three questions about egocentric economic perceptions referring to the respondent’s
current, past and future financial situations, but unfortunately it does not include
sociotropic questions. The existing empirical evidence, however, suggests that so-
ciotropic evaluations have little effect on political support since they are strongly
conditioned by party affiliation and prior opinions of the incumbent ruling party
(see Evans and Andersen, 2006; Evans and Pickup, 2010).5
As Sanders and Brynin (1999) and Johnston et al. (2005) we include the current,
retrospective and prospective egocentric economic evaluations. These measures, be-
ing of subjective nature, might be determined by individual attitudes (more or less
optimistic personalities). Since egocentric economic evaluations are likely to be
conditioned by personal experiences (see for instance, Evans and Andersen, 2006)
we explicitly induce a correlation between the evaluations and unobserved het-
erogeneity by adding the individual-specific time-averages of egocentric economic
evaluations. In addition, as a robustness check, we use annual equivalent household
income (and its individual-specific time-average) as an objective income measure
in the place of perceived current financial situation. The objective income mea-
sure effectively reproduces the impact of the subjective current financial situation
measure.6,7
3. ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY
The empirical strategy is based on testing the impact of egocentric economic
evaluations (retrospective, current and prospective) in a dynamic longitudinal model
of political party support, accounting for initial political sentiments and time-
varying political party attachment. Accordingly, we consider the dynamic binary
party support model
yit = 1 (y
∗
it > 0) , y
∗
it = xitβ+γyit−1 + εi + ηit; t = 1, ..., Ti; i = 1, ..., N ; (1)
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where y∗it is a binary latent variable capturing political party support propensity.
Individual i in period t is observed to be a supporter of a given party, as opposed
to any other political party, if y∗it (which can also be interpreted as the specific
party related benefits) crosses the zero threshold. The vector δ = (β, γ) represents
the unknown parameters to be estimated and xit is a vector of contemporaneous
explanatory variables for the ith voter in the tth time period. The composite
error term in (1), νit = εi + ηit, captures the unobserved heterogeneity underlying
individual party support preferences, being decomposed into an individual-specific
component {εi}i=1,...,N and an individual time-specific effect ηit.
The explanatory variables in xit include the ‘strong party support’(political
party attachment) variable and the three (current, retrospective, prospective) ego-
centric economic perception variables described in the previous section, together
with their respective individual-specific time-averages. All models incorporate a
standard set of socioeconomic control variables. These include age group, marital
status, employment status, university degree, an indicator of self-reported health,
number of children, outright/mortgage house ownership and respective Scottish
local authority.
Unlike earlier studies such as Evans and Andersen (2006), Johnston et al. (2005)
and Sanders and Brynin (1999) we undertake estimations for male and female vot-
ers separately for three important reasons. Primarily, the longitudinal evolution of
political party support (Figures 1 and 2) indicates higher male SNP support fre-
quencies during the entire period under analysis. Secondly, the normality assump-
tion for the unobserved individual heterogeneity underlying heterogeneous political
preferences (see eq.(3)) is more likely to be met when employing a rather homoge-
neous sample. Thirdly, recent studies such as Dhaval et al. (2016) indicate distinct
female voting participation patterns and differential gender-related determinants of
voting preferences.
3.1. Initial Conditions
We date observations starting at t = 0 so that the first self-reported politi-
cal party supported by the ith individual is yi0. Given a random draw i from
the underlying population and t = 1, 2, ..., T , and assuming ηit in equation (1) is
an iid idiosyncratic error disturbance with cdf F conditional on εi, the dynamic
unobserved effects model for individual party support is
Pr(yit = 1|yit−1, ..., yi0,xi, εi) = F (xitβ+γyit−1 + εi), t = 1, ..., Ti. (2)
It is assumed that εi is additive inside the cdf and that upon conditioning on
the vector of contemporaneous explanatory variables xit and εi, the dynamics are
of first-order.8 Treating εi as a random (unobserved) variable drawn with (yi,xi),
and assuming εi|xi ∼ N(0, σ2ε), provides consistent parameter estimates only in the
case of a static model. Including yt−1 raises the question of how we treat yi0, i.e.,
the initial conditions problem (Heckman 1981a,b).9
The presence of εi in equation (2) invalidates the assumption of exogeneity of
party support in 1999 since the start of the sample is unlikely to coincide with the
initiation of the stochastic process determining party support preferences. State de-
pendence and individual heterogeneity offer ”diametrically opposite” explanations
of habit persistence (Hsiao, 2003, p.216). Considering otherwise identical individu-
als, it is possible that those who have supported a particular party in the past will
amend their preferences determining propensities towards future voting intentions
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(the so-called swing voters): an entirely behavioural effect that could be attributed
to approval/disapproval of party policies.10
Alternatively, individuals may differ in specific unobservables affecting their
probability of political affiliation, while at the same time not being influenced by
previous voting behaviour or party performance. If such unobservables are corre-
lated over time, and are not appropriately controlled for, past party support may
turn out to be the overriding determinant of future support preferences, since it
acts as proxy for the temporally persistent unobservables. This is what Heckman
(1981a, 1981b) terms as ”spurious state dependence” as opposed to ”true (struc-
tural) state dependence”.
TABLE 3.—MALE VOTERS:  POLITICAL PARTY SUPPORT TRANSITION PROBABILITIES MATRIX, (1999-2006)
PARTY SUPPORTED PARTY SUPPORTED: frequency (transition count), Prob(yi,t+1 = vs|yi,t = vr)
frequency (transition count)
Conservative Labour Lib dem /Lib/SDP SNP other none TOTAL
Conservative 487 22 14 16 7 25 571
85.29 3.85 2.45 2.8 1.23 4.38 100
Labour 23 1,570 48 90 27 52 1,810
1.27 86.74 2.65 4.97 1.49 2.87 100
Lib dem /Lib/SDP 10 36 355 17 7 8 433
2.31 8.31 81.99 3.93 1.62 1.85 100
SNP 15 103 30 860 20 31 1,059
1.42 9.73 2.83 81.21 1.89 2.93 100
other 8 16 8 8 70 10 120
6.67 13.33 6.67 6.67 58.33 8.33 100
none 14 38 9 25 8 170 264
5.3 14.39 3.41 9.47 3.03 64.39 100
TOTAL (t>1999): 557 1,785 464 1,016 139 296 4,257
Party support 2000-2006 13.08 41.93 10.9 23.87 3.27 6.95 100
1. Source: University of Essex, ISER, BHPS, Waves 9-16. 2. Other: Plaid Cymru/Green/Other Party/other answer.
3. Off-diagonal row (r)/column (s) elements denote total voter outflow/inflow during (1999-2006), respectively.
4. r=1,…,R and s=1,….,S denote party preference (or other response), (v); r=s along the main diagonal, only.
5. Sample includes individuals with Ti>2 and no missing values in any of the covariates in the (full sample compact unbalanced) 
estimations provided in Table 5.
Voting preferences stem from two sources: an ideological component and a
policy component. Partisan voters’ voting preferences are formed on the basis of
both ideological and policy related grounds with the weight of each determinant
depending on the strength of individual-specific party bias. Non-partisans on the
other hand, being ideologically neutral, will swing exclusively in response to gov-
ernment policies (see Liberini et al., p.46, 2017). As indicated by the transition
probability matrices for the entire electorate (Tables 3 and 4) initial party prefer-
ences are strongly persistent. There is, however, a non-negligible degree of variation
in party preferences. The respective partisan transition matrices clearly indicate
that swinging, though still present, is far less common among partisan voters (Ap-
pendix, Tables A16 − A17). Accordingly, it is expected that the impact of swing
voting (captured by yt−1) will diminish among the partisan electorate since their
initial period party preferences are far more persistent: this is indeed verified by
comparing the partial effects of yt−1 for the entire electorate to the corresponding
partisan-only estimates (Tables 9-11).
Wooldridge (2005) proposes specifying a distribution of ε conditional on y0,
as opposed to Heckman’s (1981b) proposal to obtain the joint distribution of all
outcomes of the endogenous variables. We employ Wooldridge’s (2005) solution
to the initial conditions problem due to its computational simplicity. Using the
Mundlak (1978)-Chamberlain (1984) specification we induce a correlation between
εi and the time means of the nonredundant, i.e. time-varying, explanatory variables
9
taking the form of εi = xia + ξi, where ξi ∼ iid N(0, σ2ξ ) and is independent of
(xit, ηit) for all (i, t).
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TABLE 4.—FEMALE VOTERS:  POLITICAL PARTY SUPPORT TRANSITION PROBABILITIES MATRIX, (1999-2006)
PARTY SUPPORTED PARTY SUPPORTED: frequency (transition count), Prob(yi,t+1 = vs|yi,t = vr)
frequency (transition count)
Conservative Labour Lib dem /Lib/SDP SNP other none TOTAL
Conservative 669 25 39 14 3 24 774
86.43 3.23 5.04 1.81 0.39 3.1 100
Labour 14 1,786 50 93 14 57 2,014
0.7 88.68 2.48 4.62 0.7 2.83 100
Lib dem /Lib/SDP 30 36 464 19 4 12 565
5.31 6.37 82.12 3.36 0.71 2.12 100
SNP 10 100 21 726 16 51 924
1.08 10.82 2.27 78.57 1.73 5.52 100
other 3 17 8 11 65 6 110
2.73 15.45 7.27 10 59.09 5.45 100
none 18 51 12 32 4 161 278
6.47 18.35 4.32 11.51 1.44 57.91 100
TOTAL (t>1999): 744 2,015 594 895 106 311 4,665
Party support 2000-2006 15.95 43.19 12.73 19.19 2.27 6.67 100
1. Source: University of Essex, ISER, BHPS, Waves 9-16. 2. Other: Green/Other Party/other answer.
3. Off-diagonal row (r)/column (s) elements denote total voter outflow/inflow during (1999-2006), respectively.
4. r=1,…,R and s=1,….,S denote party preference (or other response), (v); r=s along the main diagonal, only.
5. Sample includes individuals with Ti>2 and no missing values in any of the covariates in the (full sample compact unbalanced) 
estimations provided in Table 6.
Under the normality assumption, the distribution of ξi in its simplest form is
ξi|yi0,xi ∼ N(ζ0 + ζ1yi0, σ2ϑ) where, ξi=ζ0 + ζ1yi0 + ϑi and ϑi| (yi0,xi) ∼ N(0, σ2ϑ).
The sample log-likelihood for the dynamic correlated random effects (CRE) probit
model corresponds to
ln(L) =
N∑
i=1
{
ln
∫ [ T∏
t=1
[Φ (xitβ+γyit−1 + ζ0 + ζ1yi0 + xia + ϑ)]
yit
[1− Φ (xitβ+γyit−1 + ζ0 + ζ1yi0 + xia + ϑ)]1−yit
]( 1
σϑ
)
φ
(
ϑ
σϑ
)
dϑ
}
, (3)
where it is assumed that ηit| (xi, yit−1, ..., yi0, ϑi) ∼ N(0, 1) and (Φ, φ) denote the cdf
and pdf of the standard Normal, respectively. Importantly, controlling for initial
conditions alone does not remove the dependence among yit−1 and ϑi. While in
the random effects model ϑi is integrated out from the likelihood in eq.(3), pooled
probit estimation is inconsistent as it ignores the presence of ϑi.
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Adopting the Mundlak (1978)-Chamberlain (1984) specification, the explana-
tory variables at time t are sit ≡ (1, xit, yit−1, yi0, xi) where xi = (Ti − 1)−1
∑Ti
t=1 xit
as suggested by Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2013).13 Including time-constant ex-
planatory variables in xit merely increases the explanatory power of the model
since it is not possible to separately identify their partial effects from their partial
correlation with the unobserved effect. Note that due to minimal within variation,
we are unable to include individual-specific time means of regional and educational
variables.
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3.2. Estimation Samples: Attrition, the Scottish Extension Sample
and Sampling Weights
In forming unbalanced panels we analyse contiguous sequences of non-missing
data with T > 3 pertaining to the sample in 1999 i.e., individuals can exit the
sample after 2001 but cannot enter ex post 1999. Such a sample selection mechanism
is used for example by Arulampalam et al. (2000) and Contoyannis et al. (2004),
and suggested by Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh (2014).14 An alternative is to employ
balanced panels since under independence among the sample selection rule and
idiosyncratic shocks to yit, the MLE is consistent provided that the initial conditions
are appropriately dealt with (see Wooldridge, 2005). However, balancing entails
efficiency losses due to discarding information, while in some cases balanced samples
may contain an insufficient number of cross-sectional units across all time periods.
In fact, regarding the entire electorate we estimate using balanced and compact
unbalanced panels, though in the partisan subsamples we only perform unbalanced
estimations due to insufficient observations.15
A further issue requiring particular attention is the use of the Scottish extension
sample, noting that without doing so an independent country-level analysis would
not have been possible.16 Since our estimation samples include original BHPS mem-
bers entering the sample before 1999, the assumption that initial observations stem
from the same exogenous distribution or selection rule becomes questionable. In
response to this, we also report estimates inclusive of an original sample member-
ship dummy. In addition, we separately estimate models for the extension sample,
but only for the entire electorate due to insufficient number of cross-sectional units
over time in the subsamples.
Finally, we perform estimations using the available longitudinal sampling weights
(from the latest wave in the sequence) to account for the different sample selection
probabilities within the whole BHPS. These weights are proportional to the inverse
of the selection probability per sampling unit, 1/ p̂it.
17,18
Under the ignorability assumption, initial period 1999 variables (zi0) determine
attrition sufficiently well so that responses sit ∈ {0, 1} and covariates in the follow-
ing periods are ignorable, that is
P (sit = 1|yit, yit−1,xit, zi0) = P (sit = 1|zi0), (t = 1, ..., T ) . (4)
Provided the assumption of selection on observables in equation (4) holds, maxi-
mum likelihood estimation using
ln(L) =
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
(sit/p̂it) ln(Lit) (5)
is asymptotically efficient and
√
N -consistent (see Wooldridge, 2002, pp.125-6).19,20
4. ESTIMATION RESULTS
We start this Section with the analysis of the initial estimation results and
the average partial effects (APEs) of the key determinants of SNP support, which
include egocentric economic evaluations. We then use an alternative specification of
the dependent variable to examine incumbent Labour Party support determinants.
Finally, we test the economic voting hypothesis over the two intervening electoral
cycles, 1999− 2002 and 2003− 2006.
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4.1. Observed Heterogeneity
The estimation results for the joint and partisan samples are given in Tables
5-6 and Table 7, respectively. They clearly indicate a key set of determinants of
political party support with varying effects by both partisanship and gender. These
consist of previous period support, initial period support, strong party support and
a combination of egocentric economic evaluation variables. A detailed analysis is
undertaken employing the more informative APEs in the following Section.
The coefficients of initial SNP support enter all estimations with particularly
strong and statistically significant effects that are much greater in magnitude than
the coefficients of lagged support. This indicates a considerable correlation between
the unobserved individual heterogeneity and the initial condition, which is notably
accentuated among the partisan electorate. As a robustness test, we also estimate
all models including a variable indicating whether an individual feels Scottish/more
Scottish in 1999 (treating perceived nationality as time-invariant). Perceived na-
tionality in 1999 enters the estimations with generally statistically significant posi-
tive coefficients, slightly reducing the estimated coefficients of initial SNP support
and having a negligible effect on lagged SNP support. There is no discernible
pattern regarding the remaining variables’ coefficients and our conclusions remain
unaltered (Appendix, Tables A13−A15).
Independently of gender, the Glasgow regional control enters most estimations
with sizeable negative effects on SNP support. University educated males are less
probable to support the SNP (Table 5), whereas employed females are more likely
to do so (Table 6). However, these educational and employment effects generally
become statistically insignificant in the partisan estimates (Table 7). Other socioe-
conomic controls like self-assessed health and the number of children influence male
and female support probabilities in opposite directions, though in the female case
they are not always statistically significant. Males above 44 years old are less likely
to support the SNP, but age is generally insignificant for females.
Finally, retrospective and prospective personal financial perceptions seem more
important determinants of SNP support than current perceptions. As a robustness
check, we also employ the (objective) annual equivalent household income (and its
individual-specific time-average) instead of the subjective current financial situation
measure and find that the corresponding estimates (Appendix, Tables A10−A12)
display no significant variation and are qualitatively similar to those in Tables
5− 7.21
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TABLE 5.—MALE DYNAMIC CRE PROBIT MODELS OF SNP SUPPORT, 1999-2006
Unbalanced (I-IV)/Balanced (V-VIII) I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Baseline Sample Dummy Weights Extension Baseline Sample Dummy Weights Extension
Lagged SNP Support 0.658*** 0.658*** 0.712*** 0.690*** 0.727*** 0.727*** 0.761*** 0.751***
SNP Supporter (1999) 3.417*** 3.408*** 3.405*** 3.473*** 3.467*** 3.471*** 3.344*** 3.403***
Strong Party Support 0.265* 0.264* 0.306* 0.301* 0.367** 0.367** 0.416* 0.399**
m(Strong Party Support) 0.558** 0.557** 0.506* 0.583** 0.558* 0.556* 0.357 0.595*
     Age 25-34 -0.449 -0.448 -0.278 -0.492 -0.227 -0.229 -0.264 -0.174
     Age 35-44 -0.361 -0.360 -0.517 -0.623* -0.384 -0.386 -0.883* -0.431
     Age >44 -0.628* -0.627* -0.576 -0.923** -0.509 -0.511 -0.787 -0.607
Married/Civil Partnership 0.259 0.258 -0.127 0.318 -0.184 -0.182 -0.335 0.074
m(Married/Civil Partnership) 0.098 0.099 0.604 0.181 0.689 0.687 0.969* 0.439
Employed/Self-employed -0.106 -0.106 -0.016 0.077 0.028 0.028 0.135 0.049
m(Employed/Self-employed) 0.236 0.237 0.142 -0.048 0.071 0.069 -0.277 0.125
University Qualifications -0.578*** -0.576*** -0.594*** -0.632*** -0.829*** -0.827*** -0.912*** -0.809***
Excellent,Good/Very Good Health -0.131 -0.132 -0.281* -0.066 -0.173 -0.172 -0.351* -0.096
m(Excellent,Good/Very Good Health) 0.551** 0.544* 0.777*** 0.546* 0.808** 0.810** 1.055*** 0.954**
Number of Children 0.312* 0.311* 0.381** 0.337* 0.515*** 0.515*** 0.507** 0.399*
m(Number of Children) -0.418** -0.408* -0.476** -0.389 -0.640*** -0.644*** -0.578** -0.517*
Own House/Mortage 0.059 0.059 0.011 0.007 0.176 0.177 0.122 0.122
m(Own House/Mortage) -0.133 -0.132 -0.118 -0.007 -0.075 -0.074 -0.022 0.088
Region: Scottish Local Authority
    Glasgow -0.576* -0.596* -0.380 -0.480 -0.770* -0.762* -0.420 -0.535
    Lothians -0.232 -0.235 -0.101 -0.124 -0.260 -0.257 -0.252 0.070
    Highlands, Islands -0.008 -0.035 0.018 0.156 -0.598 -0.589 -0.723 -0.399
    Central 0.036 0.036 0.089 0.196 0.110 0.110 0.195 0.483
    West -0.088 -0.086 -0.028 0.078 -0.427 -0.426 -0.373 -0.299
    South 0.188 0.207 0.262 0.416 -0.566* -0.572* -0.414 -0.487
    Mid-Scotland, Fife 0.086 0.082 0.094 0.072 0.149 0.150 0.131 0.377
Current Financial Situation
    Comfortably Financially 0.032 0.032 -0.012 0.044 0.315 0.315 0.228 0.195
TABLE 6.—FEMALE DYNAMIC CRE PROBIT MODELS OF SNP SUPPORT, 1999-2006
Unbalanced (I-IV)/Balanced (V-VIII) I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Baseline Sample Dummy Weights Extension Baseline
Sample 
Dummy Weights Extension
Lagged SNP Support 0.524*** 0.526*** 0.525*** 0.520*** 0.399** 0.403** 0.354** 0.291
SNP Supporter (1999) 3.537*** 3.526*** 3.482*** 3.619*** 3.931*** 3.892*** 4.071*** 4.096***
Strong Party Support 0.422*** 0.422*** 0.390*** 0.480*** 0.541*** 0.540*** 0.552*** 0.703***
m(Strong Party Support) -0.241 -0.241 -0.029 -0.315 -0.060 -0.042 0.438 -0.156
     Age 25-34 -0.037 -0.040 0.149 0.254 -0.175 -0.158 -0.058 -0.152
     Age 35-44 -0.057 -0.069 0.196 0.235 -0.025 -0.038 0.059 -0.110
     Age >44 0.328 0.321 0.522 0.591 0.215 0.213 0.324 0.160
Married/Civil Partnership -0.151 -0.152 -0.171 0.193 -0.287 -0.285 -0.036 0.039
m(Married/Civil Partnership) -0.041 -0.039 -0.079 -0.426 0.165 0.155 -0.156 -0.177
Employed/Self-employed 0.455** 0.455** 0.371* 0.427* 0.404** 0.400** 0.281 0.398*
m(Employed/Self-employed) 0.035 0.041 0.321 0.031 -0.106 -0.105 0.429 -0.029
University Qualifications -0.206 -0.201 -0.357* -0.158 -0.444 -0.432 -0.517 -0.407
Excellent,Good/Very Good Health 0.012 0.012 0.073 -0.029 -0.076 -0.077 0.002 -0.033
m(Excellent,Good/Very Good Health) -0.418* -0.431* -0.561** -0.471* -0.386 -0.422 -0.678 -0.628
Number of Children -0.084 -0.083 -0.082 -0.107 -0.332* -0.331* -0.323* -0.399*
m(Number of Children) 0.136 0.141 0.230 0.231 0.379 0.406* 0.570** 0.590**
Own House/Mortage 0.279 0.277 0.053 0.084 0.288 0.288 0.057 0.021
m(Own House/Mortage) -0.753** -0.746** -0.408 -0.527 -0.848* -0.775* -0.429 -0.613
Region: Scottish Local Authority
    Glasgow -0.372 -0.400 -0.463* -0.542* -0.705* -0.787** -0.484 -0.882*
    Lothians -0.129 -0.137 -0.001 -0.336 -0.337 -0.389 -0.359 -0.436
    Highlands, Islands 0.424 0.394 0.479 0.238 -0.045 -0.133 -0.107 -0.363
    Central 0.297 0.300 0.333 0.108 -0.027 0.005 0.142 -0.086
    West 0.208 0.205 0.310 0.109 0.091 0.103 0.272 0.164
    South 0.287 0.300 0.231 0.156 0.144 0.146 0.235 -0.176
    Mid-Scotland, Fife 0.120 0.108 0.289 -0.038 -0.210 -0.228 0.164 -0.490
Current Financial Situation
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TABLE 7.—PARTISAN DYNAMIC CRE PROBIT MODELS OF SNP SUPPORT, 1999-2006
Unbalanced (I-VI) I II III IV V VI
Baseline (Male)
Sample 
Dummy (Male)
Weights 
(Male)
Baseline 
(Female)
Sample 
Dummy 
(Female)
Weights 
(Female)
Lagged SNP Support 0.766*** 0.769*** 0.941*** 0.707** 0.708** 0.707**
SNP Supporter (1999) 6.271*** 6.234*** 6.566*** 6.078*** 6.070*** 6.075***
Strong Party Support 0.487* 0.486* 0.557* 0.187 0.187 0.222
m(Strong Party Support) 0.519 0.507 0.561 -0.256 -0.260 -0.162
     Age 25-34 -0.073 -0.067 -0.184 0.470 0.482 1.033
     Age 35-44 -0.392 -0.394 -0.325 0.475 0.486 1.142
     Age >44 -0.891 -0.898 -0.648 0.819 0.834 1.402*
Married/Civil Partnership -0.103 -0.105 0.039 -0.291 -0.293 -0.305
m(Married/Civil Partnership) 1.245** 1.245** 1.093* 0.161 0.156 0.195
Employed/Self-employed -0.011 -0.012 0.120 0.205 0.206 0.349
m(Employed/Self-employed) 0.514 0.509 0.251 -0.284 -0.276 -0.425
University Qualifications -0.548 -0.540 -0.469 -0.404 -0.412 -0.773*
Excellent,Good/Very Good Health -0.250 -0.251 -0.466 -0.223 -0.223 -0.302
m(Excellent,Good/Very Good Health) 0.904* 0.896* 1.667*** -0.154 -0.160 0.213
Number of Children 0.915*** 0.914*** 1.031*** -0.076 -0.076 -0.034
m(Number of Children) -1.480*** -1.463*** -1.553*** -0.137 -0.125 -0.114
Own House/Mortage 0.202 0.201 -0.554 0.433 0.428 0.240
m(Own House/Mortage) -0.587 -0.585 0.328 -0.897 -0.875 -0.679
Region: Scottish Local Authority
    Glasgow -1.701*** -1.721*** -1.741*** -1.082* -1.101* -1.651***
    Lothians -0.530 -0.550 -0.248 -0.353 -0.368 -0.543
    Highlands, Islands 0.160 0.121 0.051 -0.164 -0.194 -0.541
    Central -0.386 -0.384 -0.125 -0.508 -0.502 -0.721
    West -0.563 -0.565 -0.380 -0.497 -0.488 -0.558
    South 0.097 0.131 0.185 0.391 0.398 0.197
    Mid-Scotland, Fife 0.144 0.141 -0.120 0.049 0.026 -0.048
Current Financial Situation
4.2. Average Partial Effects
Given the nonlinear nature of the CRE probit models the estimated parameters
are only informative regarding the direction and relative effects of the covariates. To
obtain a clear quantitative interpretation of the effects of key explanatory variables
on the probability of SNP support we estimate the APEs based on
E [Φ (xitβ+γyit−1 + ζ0 + ζ1yi0 + xia + ϑi)] , (6)
where the expectation is over the distribution of (yi0,xi, ϑi). A consistent estimator
is
N−1
N∑
i=1
Φ
(
xitβ̂ϑ+γ̂ϑyit−1 + ζ̂0ϑ + ζ̂1ϑyi0 + xiâϑ
)
, (7)
where bξ = b/
√
(1+σ̂2ϑ) denotes a population-averaged parameter across the dis-
tribution of ξ, b =
(
β̂, γ̂, ζ̂0, ζ̂1, â
)
, and β̂, γ̂, ζ̂0, ζ̂1, â and σ̂
2
ϑ are the MLEs (see
Wooldridge, 2005).22
We calculate changes of expression (7) with respect to selected elements of xit
and yit−1 to obtain the APEs given in Tables 8-11. We provide bootstrapped
standard errors for the APEs using 250 bootstrap replications by resampling with
replacement accounting for individual-level clustering. The only exception are the
CRE estimations with sampling weights, where we perform 100 bootstrap replica-
tions.23
The strong statistical significance of the initial value of party support in Tables
5-7 indicates that initial conditions are clearly endogenous. However, accounting
for initial conditions alone still provides inconsistent parameter estimates when ϑi is
ignored by employing pooled estimation. This translates into particularly inflated
APEs for lagged party support (overstating the role of swing voting) in Table 8, as
opposed to the consistent CRE estimates given in Tables 9-11.
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TABLE 8.—POOLED PROBIT AVERAGE PARTIAL EFFECTS OF LAGGED SNP SUPPORT, 1999-2006
UNBALANCED BALANCED
I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Baseline
Sample 
Dummy Weights Extension Baseline
Sample 
Dummy
Weig
hts Extension
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
No initial conditions
Male Voters 0.734*** 0.732*** 0.737*** 0.735*** 0.741*** 0.739*** 0.734*** 0.734***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.022) (0.024) (0.025) (0.026) (0.027) (0.032)
Female Voters 0.716*** 0.714*** 0.716*** 0.711*** 0.711*** 0.705*** 0.718*** 0.697***
(0.020) (0.021) (0.023) (0.023) (0.030) (0.032) (0.034) (0.038)
Partisan Males 0.871*** 0.868*** 0.880***
(0.018) (0.019) (0.021)
Partisan Females 0.835*** 0.834*** 0.840***
(0.028) (0.029) (0.028)
Initial conditions
Male Voters 0.439*** 0.439*** 0.457*** 0.460*** 0.475*** 0.474*** 0.465*** 0.476***
(0.037) (0.037) (0.040) (0.044) (0.046) (0.047) (0.051) (0.053)
Female Voters 0.370*** 0.369*** 0.365*** 0.374*** 0.362*** 0.354*** 0.365*** 0.369***
(0.041) (0.041) (0.045) (0.043) (0.046) (0.045) (0.052) (0.053)
Partisan Males 0.468*** 0.468*** 0.504***
(0.075) (0.074) (0.081)
Partisan Females 0.444*** 0.443*** 0.402***
(0.083) (0.083) (0.081)
1. The corresponding estimates (and sample sizes) are provided in Tables A1-A6 in the Appendix.
2. Bootstrapped standard errors accounting for individual-level clustering. 3. (I-VIII): 250 bootstrap replications. 4. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, 
The most prominent APEs in the joint sample estimates generally stem from
lagged SNP support. The magnitude of state dependence is markedly greater in
the male estimates (Table 9), where previous period SNP support increases the
probability of present support between 7 (unbalanced panels) and 8 (balanced pan-
els) percentage points, whereas in the female estimates (Table 10) this effect varies
between 5 (unbalanced panels) and 3 (balanced panels) points. In contrast, strong
party support has a greater effect among the female electorate, noting that in the
balanced female estimates the respective APEs surpass the lagged support partial
effects. As indicated by (Table 6), balanced panel induced attrition diminishes the
role of state dependence in female SNP support and augments the role of initial
and strong party support.
TABLE 9.—MALE CRE PROBIT AVERAGE PARTIAL EFFECTS ON THE PROBABILITY OF SNP SUPPORT, 1999-2006
UNBALANCED BALANCED
I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Baseline Sample Dummy Weights Extension Baseline
Sample 
Dummy Weights Extension
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Lagged SNP Support 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.078*** 0.073*** 0.078*** 0.078*** 0.086*** 0.082***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.011) (0.025) (0.028) (0.028) (0.016) (0.030)
Strong Party Support 0.024* 0.024* 0.028** 0.027* 0.033** 0.033** 0.039** 0.037**
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018)
Employed/Self-employed -0.010 -0.010 -0.001 0.007 0.003 0.003 0.013 0.004
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.022) (0.022) (0.027) (0.024)
University Qualifications -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.052*** -0.055*** -0.070*** -0.070*** -0.080** -0.070***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.026) (0.026) (0.032) (0.027)
Glasgow -0.050* -0.052** -0.034 -0.042 -0.064* -0.064* -0.037 -0.047
(0.026) (0.026) (0.024) (0.031) (0.038) (0.038) (0.047) (0.046)
Comfortably Financially 0.003 0.003 -0.001 0.004 0.028 0.028 0.021 0.018
(0.022) (0.022) (0.016) (0.027) (0.031) (0.031) (0.023) (0.034)
Alright Financially 0.001 0.001 -0.011 0.004 0.024 0.024 0.007 0.02
(0.020) (0.020) (0.015) (0.023) (0.028) (0.028) (0.022) (0.032)
Just Getting by Financially -0.008 -0.007 -0.020 -0.005 -0.011 -0.011 -0.024 -0.014
(0.017) (0.017) (0.013) (0.020) (0.024) (0.024) (0.018) (0.027)
Better Finances vs last year -0.015 -0.015 -0.018** -0.027* -0.004 -0.004 -0.008 -0.017
(0.012) (0.012) (0.009) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018)
Worse Finances vs last year 0.023* 0.023* 0.021** 0.029* 0.025 0.025 0.024* 0.027
(0.013) (0.013) (0.010) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.013) (0.020)
Expect Better Finances 0.017 0.017 0.019* 0.019 0.024** 0.024** 0.027* 0.031**
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015)
Uncertain/Expect Worse Finances-0.021 -0.021 -0.018 -0.034** -0.016 -0.016 -0.016 -0.022
(0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.019)
Sample-Size 4,257 4,257 4,257 3,334 2,954 2,954 2,954 2,324
Repeating this analysis for the partisan subsample (Table 11), we find that the
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lagged and strong party support APEs estimates generally display lower statisti-
cal significance and magnitude. Moreover, the strong party support effect is now
more prominent among the male electorate. A closer inspection of the coefficient
estimates from the joint (Tables 5 and 6) and partisan samples (Table 7) indi-
cates markedly greater initial support coefficient magnitudes in the latter. This is
a major result as it indicates that partisan political party preferences are largely
predetermined and shaped by initial conditions. That is, by the positive association
between unobserved individual heterogeneity and initial party support.
The significant Glasgow regional control coefficients are generally more pro-
nounced in the partisan subsamples than in the joint sample estimates and stronger
among males, though statistical significance varies (see Tables 5, 6 and 7). This
translates into notable APEs for Glaswegian male partisans that are around 7 per-
cent less likely to be SNP supporters than their North Eastern partisan counter-
parts. This probability varies between 4 percent and 6 percent for female partisans
(see Table 11).
Among the socioeconomic controls, two distinct gender-specific attributes con-
sistently affect the SNP support probability in the joint sample estimates while
not generally having an impact in the partisan subsample estimations. First, be-
ing employed produces a female gender-specific effect in favour of SNP support,
though this vanishes in the partisan estimations. Employed (full/ part-time) and
self-employed females are generally over 3 percent more likely to be SNP supporters
according to the joint-sample estimated APEs (Table10), whereas employment has
no effect on male support (Table 9). While not directly identifiable, this outcome
could be due to a heightened interest in civic responsibility among employed females
−e.g. Dhaval et al. (2016) find that employment augmenting welfare reforms in
the US, increase female voting registration and participation.
TABLE 10.— FEMALE CRE PROBIT AVERAGE PARTIAL EFFECTS ON THE PROBABILITY OF SNP SUPPORT, 1999-2006
UNBALANCED BALANCED
I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Baseline Sample Dummy Weights Extension Baseline
Sample 
Dummy Weights Extension
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Lagged SNP Support 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.050*** 0.049*** 0.033* 0.033* 0.027*** 0.024
(0.018) (0.018) (0.007) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.008) (0.017)
Strong Party Support 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.032*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.040*** 0.056***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.010) (0.013)
Employed/Self-employed 0.037** 0.037** 0.030** 0.036 0.030** 0.030** 0.020 0.031
(0.015) (0.015) (0.012) (0.024) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.019)
University Qualifications -0.016 -0.016 -0.028* -0.013 -0.032 -0.031 -0.035 -0.03
(0.018) (0.018) (0.015) (0.021) (0.024) (0.024) (0.028) (0.033)
Glasgow -0.029 -0.031 -0.036* -0.042** -0.048* -0.054** -0.032 -0.062*
(0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.021) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.035)
Comfortably Financially -0.006 -0.006 0.003 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 0.001 0.009
(0.022) (0.022) (0.016) (0.021) (0.024) (0.024) (0.018) (0.032)
Alright Financially 0.006 0.006 0.014 0.003 0.012 0.012 0.021 0.024
(0.021) (0.021) (0.015) (0.021) (0.023) (0.023) (0.017) (0.031)
Just Getting by Financially 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.022 0.021 0.020 0.037
(0.018) (0.018) (0.013) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) (0.018) (0.030)
Better Finances vs last year -0.018** -0.018** -0.020*** -0.018 -0.011 -0.011 -0.005 -0.011
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.014)
Worse Finances vs last year -0.010 -0.010 -0.007 -0.012 -0.007 -0.007 -0.001 -0.009
(0.012) (0.012) (0.009) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.011) (0.018)
Expect Better Finances 0.018* 0.018* 0.012 0.013 0.009 0.009 0.001 -0.002
(0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.014)
Uncertain/Expect Worse Finances0.011 0.011 0.014 0.011 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.013
(0.013) (0.013) (0.009) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.017)
Sample-Size 4,665 4,665 4,665 3,453 2,961 2,961 2,961 2,177
Second, holding a university degree has a remarkable negative effect on male
support though this also vanishes in the partisan estimations. Specifically, having
a university degree (as opposed to not having) reduces the male SNP support
probability by at least 5 percent in the unbalanced and 7 percent in the balanced
joint sample estimates (Table 9), underlining that we cannot separately identify
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this effect from its partial correlation with unobserved individual heterogeneity.
Among the female electorate this effect is less pronounced and generally statistically
insignificant.
Recalling that other related studies such as Evans and Andersen (2006), John-
ston et al. (2005), Sanders and Brynin (1999) do not distinguish among the male
and female electorates, our estimates do highlight the importance of separating the
electorate by gender.
Finally, we analyse the impact of the economic perceptions variables. Compar-
ing the APEs across the distinct estimation samples gives rise to a clear pattern:
the estimated APEs in the joint samples (Tables 9, 10) do provide support for
economic voting theories, whereas, the respective APEs in the partisan estimates
(Table 11) do not. Hence, restricting estimation to the partisan fraction of the
electorate reduces the role of individual economic perceptions. This outcome con-
trasts with studies such as Evans and Pickup (2010) and Johnston et al. (2005),
where egocentric evaluations are largely irrelevant for the entire electorate. Conse-
quently, failing to study separately the partisan electorate can lead to misleading
generalisations regarding the impact of egocentric economic evaluations.
 1999-2006
MALE FEMALE
Unbalanced (I-VI) I II III IV V VI
Baseline Sample Dummy Weights Baseline Sample Dummy Weights 
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Lagged SNP Support 0.039 0.039 0.046*** 0.034 0.034 0.033***
(0.026) (0.027) (0.007) (0.023) (0.023) (0.008)
Strong Party Support 0.020* 0.020* 0.022*** 0.007 0.007 0.008*
(0.011) (0.011) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.004)
Employed/Self-employed 0.000 -0.001 0.005 0.008 0.008 0.014
(0.018) (0.018) (0.010) (0.020) (0.020) (0.011)
University Qualifications -0.023 -0.022 -0.018 -0.015 -0.016 -0.028*
(0.018) (0.018) (0.012) (0.019) (0.020) (0.015)
Glasgow -0.072** -0.074** -0.069** -0.040* -0.041 -0.059**
(0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.024) (0.025) (0.028)
Comfortably Financially -0.009 -0.009 -0.015 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001
(0.017) (0.017) (0.009) (0.024) (0.024) (0.012)
Alright Financially 0.018 0.018 0.010* 0.002 0.002 0.006
(0.015) (0.015) (0.006) (0.023) (0.023) (0.011)
Just Getting by Financially 0.005 0.005 0.001 -0.006 -0.006 -0.008
(0.012) (0.012) (0.006) (0.020) (0.020) (0.011)
Better Finances vs last year -0.001 -0.001 -0.005 -0.015 -0.015 -0.020***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007)
Worse Finances vs last year 0.016 0.016 0.017*** -0.007 -0.007 -0.004
(0.011) (0.011) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006)
Expect Better Finances 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.013 0.013 0.016***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.004) (0.010) (0.010) (0.005)
Uncertain/Expect Worse Finances -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.004 0.004 0.003
(0.012) (0.012) (0.006) (0.013) (0.013) (0.006)
Sample Size 2,384 2,384 2,384 2,687 2,687 2,687
TABLE 11.— PARTISAN CRE PROBIT AVERAGE PARTIAL EFFECTS ON THE PROBABILITY OF SNP SUPPORT,
More specifically, the joint sample estimated APEs of economic perceptions (Ta-
bles 9 and 10) are in line with the predictions of post-election models of economic
voting, where the voter’s choice generally depends on retrospective economic eval-
uations. This is particularly true among the male electorate, where experiencing
worse personal finances compared to the year before augments the probability of
SNP support by over 2 percent across all of the unbalanced estimates and the bal-
anced weighted sample estimates (see Table 9), and where perceiving a financial
improvement has the opposite effect, being the statistical significance in this case
limited to the unbalanced weighted and extension samples. Among the female elec-
torate (Table 10), perceiving a financial improvement decreases the SNP support
probability, but negative retrospective evaluations have no significant effect. Hence,
the impact of retrospective evaluations is consistent with the presence of electoral
accountability.
With respect to prospective evaluations, the interpretation of the results in
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relation with the predictions of economic voting theories is less straightforward.
Namely, pre-election models establish that optimistic expectations about changes
in economic conditions will favour the incumbent government party whereas pes-
simistic expectations will favour the opposition party. We can see that the cor-
responding APEs estimated coefficients in the joint samples (not always statisti-
cally significant) have the wrong sign according to these theoretical implications.
Nonetheless, a closer inspection of the male coefficient estimates in Tables 5 and 7
reveals that the positive sign of better future finances in Table 9 is driven by the
partisan portion of the male electorate.
In particular, Table 5 reveals that the within-mean of uncertain/worse financial
expectations constitutes the most important egocentric economic evaluation deter-
minant of male SNP support, as it enters all estimates with positive statistically
significant coefficients and the most sizeable magnitude. The male partisan esti-
mates, on the other hand, reveal that the within-mean of better financial expecta-
tions significantly augments the SNP support probability with a sizeable coefficient
(see Table 7). Hence, the positive impact of optimistic financial expectations on the
male SNP support (Table 9) seems to be driven by the partisan portion of the male
electorate. Thus, male voters systematically reporting pessimistic expectations are
more likely to support the main opposition party, which is in line with economic
(pre-election) voting theories.
Regarding the female prospective economic evaluations, the APEs (Tables 10
and 11) and the corresponding estimated parameter coefficients (Tables 6 and 7)
clearly indicate that expectations play a much less prominent role than in the
male estimations. Better expected finances also increase female support (though
statistical significance varies) but, unlike in the male estimates, there is no evidence
that this effect is driven by the partisan fraction of the electorate.
Concerning perceptions about the current financial situation, these are generally
statistically insignificant (Tables 9, 10 and 11). However, the within-mean of alright
current finances constitutes the most important egocentric evaluation determinant
among partisan females, since it enters all estimates with a sizeable positive signif-
icant coefficient (Table 7). Therefore, consistently reporting good current finances
among the partisan female electorate increases the probability of SNP support.
In summary, retrospective and prospective egocentric economic evaluations af-
fect party support, their influence is consistent with the predictions of economic
voting theories, they are more pronounced among male than female voters and less
important among the partisan subsamples. Quite importantly, among the parti-
san fraction of the electorate, financial security is positively associated with SNP
support.
4.3. Alternative Specification of the Dependent Variable: Incumbent
Labour Party Support
During the entire period under study, the SNP constituted the main opposi-
tion to the leading governing Labour Party. So there might be voters who switch
from Labour support to SNP support for retrospective reasons (e.g. attributing
the responsibility of a worsening financial position to the incumbent party), event
captured by the definition of the binary SNP support indicator, but other swing
voters under the same circumstances might well decide to punish the incumbent
Labour with a switch in favour of other political parties. In the latter case our
dependent variable, SNP support, would record no change. In response to this, we
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restructure the dependent variable so that it takes the value of one if an individual
indicates Labour Party support and zero otherwise.
To ensure that the estimates employing the initial dependent variable specifica-
tion do not merely identify nationalist propensity determinants, but also indicate
economic voting behaviour, we reestimate all models in Tables 5-7 using instead
the binary indicator for Labour support. The estimates for Labour party support
(Appendix, Tables A7-A9) are effectively the mirror image of the results obtained
using the SNP indicator specification: the economic factors augmenting opposition
(SNP) support reduce incumbent (Labour) support and vice-versa. Hence, our ini-
tial SNP support specification is indeed an adequate measure that fits the purpose
of identifying economic voting determinants generically outside the electoral cycle.
4.4. Economic Voting and the Electoral Cycle
The timing of policy choices is a crucial question in probabilistic voting mod-
els conceiving economic policies as the outcome of a well defined non-cooperative
game. In pre-election models, parties/candidates formulate (enforceable) electoral
promises and then compete for office (prospective evaluations). In post-election
models, all the action in policy making takes place once elected politicians are in
office and, rather than selecting policies, voters select politicians generally on the
basis of their behaviour as incumbents (retrospective evaluations)- see for example,
Persson and Tabellini (2000).
As political preferences do display some variation over time (see Tables 1-4) it
is important to account for the dynamics triggered in different phases of the elec-
toral cycle. The transition probability matrices for the two electoral cycles reveal
non-negligible outflows of past Labour voters to other parties, not only the SNP
but also Conservatives and Liberal Democrats, as well as towards not supporting
any party (see Appendix, Tables A18-A21). Given that the short duration of the
electoral cycles (four years) provides a small number of transitions and, as already
mentioned, the binary SNP support indicator will not capture all of these outflows,
identification of swing voting determinants over the electoral cycles requires the
use of the Labour support indicator. Accordingly, we estimate incumbent Labour
Party support determinants during the periods preceding the two elections: 1999-
2002 and 2003-2006.
Following the UK 1997 general election, the Labour Party became the leading
governing party in the UK, and after the establishment of the new Scottish Parlia-
ment in 1999, the Labour Party was also established as the governing party in the
advent of the 1999 and 2003 Scottish Parliament elections. So the aforementioned
periods could be viewed as both pre- and post-election periods. This is partic-
ularly reflected in the estimates for the first electoral cycle of 1999-2002 (Tables
12-13) where, both prospective and retrospective economic evaluations appear as
significant determinants of Labour Party support with the latter having a greater
impact.24
Over the 1999-2002 electoral cycle, both a repeated perceived deterioration of
the financial situation with respect to the previous year (retrospective evaluation)
and a repeated expectation of uncertain/worse finances (prospective evaluation)
decrease the probability of support for the incumbent Labour Party. In the short
run, however, expected uncertain/worse finances increases the probability of Labour
Party support, perhaps reflecting that the incumbent government party is seen as
a safer option. This economic voting behaviour holds across genders, though it is
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more relevant in the male electorate (see Tables 12-13). These results are in line
with the male SNP/Labour Party support estimates obtained for the whole period
1999-2006 (see Table 5, and Table A7 in the Appendix).
Over the 2003-2006 electoral cycle, repeatedly reporting improved finances in-
creases the Labour support probability among female voters in all models, but
economic voting behaviour is absent in the male electorate (Tables 14-15). Hence,
regarding both electorate cycles retrospective economic evaluations appear to be a
major determinant of party support preferences and, except for the male estimates
over the 2003-2006 electoral cycle, the results do provide clear evidence that ego-
centric economic evaluations constitute an important factor of individual political
support during the two intervening electoral cycles.
TABLE 12.—MALE DYNAMIC CRE PROBIT MODELS OF LABOUR PARTY SUPPORT, 1999-2002
Unbalanced (I-IV)/Balanced (V-VIII) I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Baseline Sample Dummy Weights Extension Baseline Sample Dummy Weights Extension
Lagged Labour Support 0.408* 0.409* 0.249 0.400* 0.357 0.357 0.212 0.342
Labour Supporter (1999) 3.910*** 3.909*** 4.162*** 3.803*** 4.231*** 4.231*** 4.402*** 4.024***
Strong Party Support 0.079 0.079 0.050 -0.054 0.022 0.022 0.014 -0.177
m(Strong Party Support) -0.200 -0.198 -0.282 -0.131 -0.259 -0.259 -0.361 -0.092
Current Financial Situation
    Comfortably Financially -0.094 -0.095 -0.028 -0.099 0.030 0.030 0.089 0.026
    m(Comfortably Financially) 0.918 0.916 0.651 0.893 0.897 0.898 0.862 0.705
    Alright Financially -0.333 -0.333 -0.150 -0.237 -0.298 -0.298 -0.086 -0.204
    m(Alright Financially) 0.948 0.946 0.892 0.777 1.086 1.087 1.218 0.668
    Just Getting by Financially -0.214 -0.215 -0.133 -0.029 -0.179 -0.179 -0.103 0.034
    m(Getting by Financially) 0.665 0.665 0.728 0.652 0.840 0.840 1.238 0.729
Change in Financial Position
    Better Finances vs last year 0.125 0.125 0.085 0.297* 0.162 0.161 0.120 0.313*
    m(Better Finances vs last year) -0.203 -0.205 -0.213 0.110 -0.502 -0.502 -0.419 0.023
    Worse Finances vs last year 0.016 0.016 -0.110 0.103 0.032 0.032 -0.072 0.069
    m(Worse Finances vs last year) -0.974** -0.976** -0.964* -0.869* -1.315*** -1.314*** -1.232** -1.210**
Financial Expectations
    Expect Better Finances -0.202 -0.202 -0.161 -0.131 -0.232 -0.232 -0.219 -0.176
    m(Expect Better Finances) -0.215 -0.210 -0.217 -0.672 -0.190 -0.191 -0.256 -0.748
    Uncertain/Expect Worse Finances 0.383 0.382 0.574** 0.617** 0.424 0.424 0.580** 0.606**
    m(Uncertain/Expect Worse Finances) -0.529 -0.532 -0.694 -0.965* -0.544 -0.543 -0.752 -0.986*
Original Sample Member 0.065 -0.012
Constant -2.005*** -2.014*** -2.059*** -1.947*** -2.158*** -2.157*** -2.431*** -1.745**
Log-Likelihood -694.517 -694.468 -725.378 -554.588 -612.701 -612.699 -642.983 -495.584
Sample Size 2,289 2,289 2,289 1,792 2,055 2,055 2,055 1,602
Wald (Global Significance) 249.663 250.541 190.460 208.955 207.552 208.426 157.791 184.071
Intra-Class Correlation 0.694*** 0.694*** 0.728*** 0.696*** 0.728*** 0.728*** 0.755*** 0.729***
1. Only coefficients on selected key variables displayed. 2. Estimations include all remaining explanatory variables appearing in Table 5. 
3. Notes 1-7 appearing at the bottom of Table 5 also apply here.
TABLE 13.—FEMALE DYNAMIC CRE PROBIT MODELS OF LABOUR PARTY SUPPORT, 1999-2002
Unbalanced (I-IV)/Balanced (V-VIII) I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Baseline Sample Dummy Weights Extension Baseline Sample Dummy Weights Extension
Lagged Labour Support 0.514** 0.501** 0.788*** 0.353 0.584*** 0.574*** 0.883*** 0.394
Labour Supporter (1999) 4.121*** 4.159*** 3.668*** 4.488*** 4.058*** 4.089*** 3.588*** 4.535***
Strong Party Support 0.091 0.093 0.073 -0.098 0.065 0.066 0.013 -0.108
m(Strong Party Support) 0.269 0.271 0.020 0.392 0.255 0.261 -0.087 0.371
Current Financial Situation
    Comfortably Financially -0.039 -0.037 -0.056 0.038 -0.016 -0.012 0.031 0.080
    m(Comfortably Financially) 0.375 0.387 0.406 -0.152 0.070 0.074 -0.127 -0.585
    Alright Financially 0.034 0.035 -0.001 0.138 0.105 0.109 0.152 0.239
    m(Alright Financially) 0.307 0.342 0.366 -0.008 -0.297 -0.277 -0.453 -0.835
    Just Getting by Financially 0.061 0.061 -0.022 0.100 0.102 0.104 0.070 0.193
    m(Getting by Financially) 0.452 0.441 0.604 0.312 0.296 0.289 0.315 -0.014
Change in Financial Position
    Better Finances vs last year 0.081 0.080 0.049 0.060 0.112 0.111 0.119 0.080
    m(Better Finances vs last year) -0.290 -0.312 -0.107 -0.379 -0.164 -0.174 -0.060 -0.282
    Worse Finances vs last year 0.244 0.245 0.286 0.212 0.210 0.210 0.249 0.153
    m(Worse Finances vs last year) -0.852* -0.838* -0.759 -0.681 -1.267** -1.251** -1.294*** -1.327**
Financial Expectations
    Expect Better Finances -0.055 -0.052 -0.054 -0.127 -0.064 -0.063 -0.062 -0.161
    m(Expect Better Finances) 0.217 0.179 -0.034 0.224 -0.025 -0.065 -0.314 0.217
    Uncertain/Expect Worse Finances 0.347 0.346 0.494* 0.373 0.521** 0.521** 0.690*** 0.590**
    m(Uncertain/Expect Worse Finances) -0.105 -0.114 -0.622 -0.181 -0.273 -0.283 -0.853* -0.082
Original Sample Member -0.375* -0.261
Constant -2.835*** -2.771*** -2.853*** -2.396*** -2.724*** -2.688*** -2.346*** -2.444***
Log-Likelihood -754.309 -752.575 -690.817 -557.423 -624.325 -623.523 -559.612 -452.374
Sample Size 2,583 2,583 2,583 1,924 2,259 2,259 2,259 1,668
Wald (Global Significance) 264.286 261.137 301.829 177.661 256.214 253.876 310.112 165.370
Intra-Class Correlation 0.729*** 0.730*** 0.703*** 0.751*** 0.693*** 0.694*** 0.652*** 0.725***
1. Only coefficients on selected key variables displayed. 2. Estimations include all remaining explanatory variables appearing in Table 5. 
3. Notes 1-7 appearing at the bottom of Table 5 also apply here.
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TABLE 14.—MALE DYNAMIC CRE PROBIT MODELS OF LABOUR PARTY SUPPORT, 2003-2006
Unbalanced (I-IV)/Balanced (V-VIII) I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Baseline Sample Dummy Weights Extension Baseline Sample Dummy Weights Extension
Lagged Labour Support 0.682** 0.682** 0.568* 0.787** 0.679** 0.679** 0.553* 0.783**
Labour Supporter (2003) 3.507*** 3.511*** 3.770*** 2.996*** 3.535*** 3.536*** 3.788*** 3.006***
Strong Party Support -0.304 -0.303 -0.460* -0.553** -0.214 -0.214 -0.382 -0.456*
m(Strong Party Support) 0.387 0.394 0.588 0.522 0.211 0.216 0.404 0.363
Current Financial Situation
    Comfortably Financially -0.555 -0.557 -0.526 -0.468 -0.684 -0.685 -0.637 -0.626
    m(Comfortably Financially) 0.130 0.124 0.141 -0.262 0.657 0.654 0.875 0.296
    Alright Financially -0.420 -0.422 -0.340 -0.385 -0.515 -0.516 -0.426 -0.501
    m(Alright Financially) 0.429 0.443 0.562 -0.045 1.041 1.047 1.360 0.518
    Just Getting by Financially -0.324 -0.325 -0.212 -0.182 -0.348 -0.348 -0.237 -0.216
    m(Getting by Financially) -0.505 -0.505 -0.705 -1.037 -0.112 -0.111 -0.120 -0.662
Change in Financial Position
    Better Finances vs last year 0.058 0.057 0.213 0.026 0.025 0.025 0.181 0.005
    m(Better Finances vs last year) 0.263 0.269 -0.040 0.350 0.444 0.448 0.144 0.495
    Worse Finances vs last year -0.174 -0.174 -0.040 -0.120 -0.191 -0.191 -0.056 -0.131
    m(Worse Finances vs last year) 0.282 0.316 0.135 0.388 0.584 0.603 0.523 0.690
Financial Expectations
    Expect Better Finances 0.055 0.055 0.083 0.132 -0.021 -0.020 0.019 0.052
    m(Expect Better Finances) -0.348 -0.338 -0.129 -0.498 -0.359 -0.353 -0.148 -0.517
    Uncertain/Expect Worse Finances -0.357 -0.356 -0.280 -0.337 -0.401 -0.400 -0.314 -0.392
    m(Uncertain/Expect Worse Finances) -0.505 -0.486 -0.757 -0.350 -0.527 -0.514 -0.803 -0.375
Original Sample Member -0.203 -0.112
Constant -1.245 -1.241 -1.198 -0.552 -1.700** -1.702** -1.827** -0.967
Log-Likelihood -456.453 -456.102 -470.706 -383.229 -426.64 -426.541 -441.64 -356.215
Sample Size 1,676 1,676 1,676 1,330 1,572 1,572 1,572 1,242
Wald (Global Significance) 216.376 217.576 188.813 198.561 203.167 205.467 174.274 187.235
Intra-Class Correlation 0.629*** 0.628*** 0.662*** 0.580*** 0.632*** 0.631*** 0.663*** 0.584***
1. Only coefficients on selected key variables displayed. 2. Estimations include all remaining explanatory variables appearing in Table 5. 
3. Notes 1-7 appearing at the bottom of Table 5 also apply here.
TABLE 15.—FEMALE DYNAMIC CRE PROBIT MODELS OF LABOUR PARTY SUPPORT, 2003-2006
Unbalanced (I-IV)/Balanced (V-VIII) I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Baseline Sample Dummy Weights Extension Baseline Sample Dummy Weights Extension
Lagged Labour Support 0.337 0.341 0.472 0.369 0.415 0.419 0.545 0.427
Labour Supporter (2003) 5.595*** 5.624*** 5.254*** 5.459*** 5.898*** 5.958*** 5.513*** 5.895***
Strong Party Support -0.335 -0.335 -0.072 -0.233 -0.372 -0.374 -0.098 -0.264
m(Strong Party Support) 0.701 0.729 0.567 0.730 0.313 0.316 0.189 0.326
Current Financial Situation
    Comfortably Financially 0.057 0.062 -0.317 0.010 -0.125 -0.121 -0.496 -0.153
    m(Comfortably Financially) -0.620 -0.697 -0.558 -0.783 -0.394 -0.545 -0.154 -1.137
    Alright Financially 0.047 0.053 -0.283 -0.060 -0.179 -0.174 -0.459 -0.292
    m(Alright Financially) 0.793 0.748 0.666 0.527 1.039 0.923 0.984 0.317
    Just Getting by Financially 0.403 0.413 0.210 0.530 0.122 0.134 -0.049 0.321
    m(Getting by Financially) -0.736 -0.820 -0.853 -1.065 -0.633 -0.795 -0.536 -1.786
Change in Financial Position
    Better Finances vs last year -0.344 -0.347 -0.239 -0.301 -0.313 -0.316 -0.337 -0.370
    m(Better Finances vs last year) 1.201** 1.192** 1.125* 1.433** 1.302* 1.296* 1.525** 1.835**
    Worse Finances vs last year 0.080 0.083 -0.009 0.213 -0.038 -0.036 -0.213 0.181
    m(Worse Finances vs last year) -0.469 -0.405 -0.563 -0.109 0.184 0.266 0.247 0.417
Financial Expectations
    Expect Better Finances 0.155 0.156 0.245 0.006 0.368 0.371 0.522** 0.220
    m(Expect Better Finances) -0.065 -0.115 0.008 0.242 0.010 -0.068 -0.038 0.482
    Uncertain/Expect Worse Finances -0.277 -0.280 -0.308 -0.247 -0.221 -0.221 -0.319 -0.116
    m(Uncertain/Expect Worse Finances) -0.233 -0.257 -0.282 -1.020 0.047 0.034 -0.014 -0.520
Original Sample Member -0.395 -0.523
Constant -5.469*** -5.383*** -4.214*** -5.794*** -5.906*** -5.741*** -4.842*** -5.946***
Log-Likelihood -462.371 -461.693 -422.3 -355.786 -393.156 -392.222 -360.807 -299.082
Sample Size 1,869 1,869 1,869 1,400 1,683 1,683 1,683 1,254
Wald (Global Significance) 132.535 133.915 ###### 105.335 125.030 125.592 146.687 99.218
Intra-Class Correlation 0.831*** 0.830*** 0.806*** 0.832*** 0.838*** 0.837*** 0.820*** 0.835***
1. Only coefficients on selected key variables displayed. 2. Estimations include all remaining explanatory variables appearing in Table 5. 
3. Notes 1-7 appearing at the bottom of Table 5 also apply here.
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
We explore the dynamics of SNP support using longitudinal data from the BHPS
dataset during the period 1999-2006. Exploiting the Scottish extension sample, we
investigate the relative importance of political sentiments and egocentric economic
evaluations by disentangling the effects of state dependence and unobserved het-
erogeneity.
We study the evolution of gender-specific political party preferences both among
the entire electorate and among the partisan subsample. We employ a dynamic
specification, consider both compact unbalanced and balanced panel sample selec-
tion mechanisms, and account for initial conditions and unequal sample selection
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probabilities.
Our main results can be summarised as follows. With respect to political senti-
ments, even after controlling for the unobserved heterogeneity, political party sup-
port preferences are quite persistent, being persistence generally stronger among
the male electorate. The role of state dependence is, however, substantially re-
duced upon restricting estimations to the partisan subsample. The initial value of
political party support is the most important determinant of party support, having
markedly greater coefficient magnitudes compared to those of the lagged support
variable. This indicates a considerable correlation between the unobserved individ-
ual heterogeneity and the initial condition, which is particularly accentuated among
the partisan electorate.
Regarding egocentric economic evaluations, their impact on political party sup-
port differs by gender and depends on the voter’s political proximity, exerting a
stronger influence on the male SNP support. Considering the entire electorate
samples, retrospective and prospective egocentric economic evaluations do affect
political party support in accordance with the egocentric economic voting hypothe-
sis: the electors hold the incumbent government party accountable for their personal
financial situation. Among the partisan electorate, however, the role of egocentric
economic evaluations is reduced. In fact, financial stability and optimism increase
partisan support for the main opposition party, which is effectively at odds with
economic voting theoretical predictions.
To ensure that our estimates are not merely capturing nationalist propensity
determinants, and to account for outflows from the incumbent Labour to parties
other than the SNP, we additionally estimate models of Labour party support.
Employing the Labour support indicator shows that the economic evaluations that
increase the opposition (SNP) support reduce incumbent (Labour) support and
vice-versa.
Our study highlights the importance of employing longitudinal data over a suf-
ficiently long time period for the analysis of the economic vote hypothesis. Indeed,
the most prominent party support determinant for the entire male electorate, other
than initial support, is consistently expecting uncertain/worse finances. Therefore,
long-term differences in egocentric evaluations are more likely to influence political
support as opposed to short-term evaluations, which is in line with the conclu-
sion of Pickup and Evans (2013). Further, concerning the partisan electorate, sys-
tematically reporting alright current finances and better expected finances are the
principal egocentric evaluation determinants of nationalist party support among
females and males, respectively. Therefore, failure to perform separate estimations
for the partisan electorate can lead to erroneous generalisations about the impact
of egocentric economic evaluations.
Finally, we test the validity of the economic voting hypothesis accounting for the
dynamics triggered in different phases of the electoral cycle. Estimating incumbent
(Labour) support models during the two intervening electoral cycles (1999-2002
and 2003-2006) we find clear evidence that retrospective economic evaluations do
constitute an important determinant of incumbent party support.
Our results are in agreement with studies providing supporting evidence for
economic voting theories (e.g. Sanders and Brynin, 1999, Nadeau et al., 2012) and
contrasts with the works of Evans and Pickup (2010) and Johnston et al. (2005)
concluding that egocentric evaluations are largely irrelevant for the entire electorate.
The obvious future research direction is to verify whether our general conclusions
about the economic voting hypothesis and partisanship can be validated among
22
distinct country electorates.
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Notes
1In another international comparative study Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2000) review a volumi-
nous body of research concluding that sociotropic and egocentric economic evaluations do influence
government support. Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier’s (2013) review of micro-studies concludes that
retrospective evaluations have a greater impact than prospective ones.
2Voting studies using the BHPS, other than Johnston et al. (2005), are not abundant and do
not focus on the Scotland. Oswald and Powdthavee (2010) show that having daughters makes
people more likely to vote for left-wing parties. Powdthavee and Oswald (2014) find that lottery
winners, particularly males, tend to switch to more right-wing parties. Liberini et al. (2017),
controlling for financial and economic circumstances, find that individuals that are more satisfied
with life tend to vote for the governing party.
3University of Essex. Institute for Social and Economic Research. (2010). British House-
hold Panel Survey: Waves 1-18, 1991-2009. [data collection]. 7th Ed. UK Data Service. SN:
5151, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-5151-1; Conditional Access, Local Authority District
Codes. [data collection]. 3rd Ed. UK Data Service. SN: 6028, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-
SN-6028-1.
4Regional controls are formed according to the official Scottish Parliament electoral regions and
constituencies as follows. Glasgow City, Lothians (East and Midlothian, Borders, Edinburgh City,
West Lothians, Lothian n.o.s), Higlands and Islands (NW Highlands, Western Isles, S & E High-
lands, Orkney, Shetlands, Highlands & Islands n.o.s), Central Scotland (Farlik, Cumbernauld &
Kilsyth, Monklands, East Kilbride, Hamilton, Motherwell), West Scotland (Argyll & Bute, Dum-
barton, Inverclyde, Bearsden, Clydebank, Strathkelvin, Cunninghame, Renfrew), South Scotland
(Annadale, Nithsdale, Stewarty, Wigtown: Dumfries and Galloway, Clydesdale, Cumnock Doon,
Kyle Carric, Eastwood, Kilmarnock & Loudoun, Dumfries and Galloway n.o.s), Mid Scotland
and Fife (Clackmannan, Stirling, Dunfermline, Kirkcaldy, NE Fife, Angus, Perth & Kinross, Fife
n.o.s.), North East Scotland (Aberdeen City, Bannfshire & Buchan, Moray, Gordon, Kincardine
& Deeside, Dundee City).
5Sociotropic evaluations could be proxied, at least to certain extent, by regional gross domestic
product growth and other macroeconomic indicators. However, we do not have data on such
variables for the breakdown of the Local Authority controls included during the entire period
analysed. Nevertheless, including regional macroeconomic variables would only add constants
(displaying some annual variation) per regional grouping of individuals. This is already captured
by the inclusion of regional controls and time period dummies.
6Equivalent income is computed as annual household income divided by the square root of
household members to account for differences in households’ size and composition.
7Liberini et al., (2017) use equivalent income and retrospective evaluations. Sanders and Brynin
(1999) include changes in egocentric evaluations and net personal annual income, whereas, Oswald
and Powdthavee (2010) only use annual deflated household income per capita. The former get
near zero coefficients on income.
8Further, the model assumes strict exogeneity of the xit conditional on εi, as only xit appears
on the RHS of eq.(2) , while xi=(xi1, ...,xiT ) enters in the conditioning set of the LHS. For
unbalanced panels, we have to assume that the sample selection process is strictly exogenous with
respect to the idiosyncratic shocks to yit and that unbalancedness is independent of εi. Ignoring
the unbalancedness can produce inconsistent parameter estimates unless the sample selection
process is independent of initial condition shocks and, additionally, the process is either in a
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steady state or the initial observations stem from the same exogenous distribution or selection
rule ∀ i and ti (see Albarran et al., 2015, p.7).
9Fixed effects (FE) estimation leaves the conditional distribution of εi unrestricted but given
fixed-T asymptotics we cannot obtain consistent MLE estimates of δ due to the presence of εi in
eq.(2), see Heckman (1981b). Carro (2007) offers a modified FE MLE for dynamic discrete choice
though effective bias reduction requires T > 8. Honore´ and Kyriazidou (2000) propose a fixed-
T consistent (though not
√
N -consistent) estimator for dynamic discrete choice with continuous
exogenous covariates requiring the logistic and further assumptions.
10Swing voters can be either ideologically neutral or not (defined as non-partisans/partisans in
our analysis, respectively). Swing voting in this study reflects a change in voting intentions (not
actual voting outcomes) among two consecutive time periods. This is somewhat distinct to the
definition used in the literature whereby swinging refers to voting a different party from that of
the previous electoral cycle
11Arulampalam and Stewart (2009) show that none of the Heckman (1981b) and Wooldridge
(2005) estimators dominates the other and, once the Mundlak (1978)-Chamberlain (1984) corre-
lated random effects (CRE) framework is employed the estimators give similar results.
12Failure to account for initial conditions and ignoring the presence of unobserved heterogeneity
(ϑi) substantially inflates the impact of yit−1(see Appendix, Tables A1-A3). Controlling for initial
conditions but not accounting for the presence of ϑi still provides inconsistent parameter estimates
and inflates the coefficients on yit−1(see Appendix, Tables A4-A6).
13This version of estimator performs similarly, in terms of relative bias and RMSE, to the
specification of the conditional distribution of unobserved heterogeneity in Wooldridge (2005)
except for the case of an AR(1) process assumed for xit with short panels (see Rabe-Hesketh and
Skrondal, 2013).
14Albarran et al. (2015) suggest simultaneous estimation of all available contiguous sequences,
that is sub-panels of observations with T > 3. As only left-side unbalancedness is present in our
analysis, i.e., different starting periods and a common ending period in 2006 (T = 8), this gives
6 distinct sub-panels. Nevertheless, 1999 is the sample initiation period for approximately 90.4
percent of individuals and distinct initiation period sub-panels do not contain sufficient obser-
vations, particularly as the panel lengthens. The same holds regarding the partisan subsamples
where 1999 is the sample initiation period of approximately 88.5 percent individuals. Thus, we
cannot apply this estimation strategy.
15We carry out sample attrition tests by adding functions of individual responses in our un-
balanced estimations (see Verbeek and Nijman, 1992, p.688). The attrition-detection controls
generally have positive statistically significant coefficients in the male samples and negative and
insignificant in the female samples (the corresponding estimates are available upon request).
16The Scottish extension sample was aimed towards increasing the small sample size of around
400-500 households in the initial BHPS sample to approximately 1,500 respondent households (see
Taylor et al., Table 25, p.156, 2010).
17Longitudinal weights at any wave of the BHPS are a product of the sequence of attrition
weights accounting for losses between each contiguous pair of waves up to that point, and the
initial period respondent weight (see Taylor et al., p.190, 2010). We employ the wLRWTSW2
respondent weight from the latest wave, ‘w’, in the longitudinal sequence as suggested by the data
depositors when performing longitudinal analyses of individual respondents from the original and
extension samples at the Scottish level (see Taylor et al., Table 25, p.197, 2010).
18In the unweighted sample there are around 2.5 as many observations in Scotland than expected
from the population distribution. Weighting in the BHPS employs a weighting class method where
individuals are classified into respondents/non-respondents via variables that are informative of
non-response such as age, sex, employment status and education. Initial sample members present
in 1999 were eligible for a positive weight (as opposed to zero), regardless of previous waves’
response status (see Taylor et al., pp.192-5, 2010).
19Estimation with sampling weights is undertaken using the ”gllamm” command in Stata as-
signing the respective longitudinal sampling weight (from the latest wave in the sequence) at the
individual level (level 2) while the panel wave (level 1) weight is set to unity.
20Robust standard errors can be used since sampling weights do not apply to units at a lower
level than the highest level (within the context of a multilevel model)- see Rabe-Hesketh and
Skrondal (2006, pp.811-2).
21Including the objective annual equivalent household income along with the three subjective
economic evaluations is another option, noting that annual household income and current finances
are collinear to a certain extent. The respective estimations (available by the authors upon request)
do not change our conclusions regarding the impact of individual retrospective and prospective
evaluations.
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22The presence of ϑi in equation (3) renders successive disturbances temporally correlated. The
intra-class correlation coefficient ρ=corr(νit, νis)=
σ2ϑ
σ2
ϑ
+σ2η
; t, s=2, ..., T ; t 6= s (normalising σ2η=1)
is provided at the bottom of all CRE estimates and it is always statistically significant rendering
pooled probit estimation inappropriate. In the pooled models, σ2ν is normalised to 1 and the
estimated βs are population-averaged parameters by default.
23Bootstrap replications for CRE models with sampling weights are computationally very time-
consuming. In estimating standard errors 50–200 bootstrap replications are generally sufficient
(Mooney and Duval, 1993, p.11). Using 100 instead of 250 bootstrap replications in all CRE
models without samlping weights had either minimal or no impact on the statistical significance
of the APEs.
24We do not report the estimates for the partisan samples since t=4 in the two electoral cy-
cles analysed is too short. This translates into an insufficiently large number of transitions so
as to facilitate identification of swing voting behaviour among a fraction of the electorate that
has particularly persistent voting preferences (the corresponding transition probabilities and the
estimations are available upon request).
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